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Short about the project 
Auctions for Renewable Energy Support: Effective use and efficient implementation 
options (AURES) 
This project helps assessing the applicability of different auction types to renewable support 
under different market conditions. It also explores which auction types and design specificat
suit particular requirements and policy goals in European countries. By establishing best 
practices and a knowledge sharing network, we contribute to informed policy decision
and to the success of auction implementations across Europe.
Target-oriented analysis: Through analysis of empirical experiences, experiments and 
simulation, we will create a flexible policy support tool that supports policy makers in deciding 
on the applicability of auction types and certain design specifications for their
Capacity building activities: We undertake specific implementation cases to derive best 
practices and trigger knowledge sharing amongst Member States. We strive to create a strong 
network with workshops, webinars, bilateral meetings, n
capacity building platform for both policy makers and market participants (including project 
developers, auctioneers,etc.). Wherever required, we can set up specific bilateral and 
multilateral meetings on specific auction issues and facilitate cooperation and knowledge 
sharing. Additionally, we offer sparring on specific implementation options, drawing from 
insights gained during the first phases of the project (empirical analysis of previous auctions in 
Europe and the world), conceptual and theoretical analysis on the applicability of specific 
designs in certain market conditions and for certain policy goals issues and facilitate 
cooperation and knowledge sharing. Additionally, we offer sparring on specific implement
options, drawing from insights gained during the first phases of the project (empirical analysis of 
previous auctions in Europe and the world), conceptual and theoretical analysis on the 
applicability of specific designs in certain market conditions 
Project consortium: eight renowned public institutions and private firms from five European 
countries and combines some of the leading energy policy experts in Europe, with an 
impressive track record of successful research and
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This report deals with the use and design of pre
auctions. It is one in a series of four Policy Memos published by the AURES project:
Policy Memo 1: Secondary objectives in auctions
Policy Memo 2: Pre-qualifications and penalties
Policy Memo 3: The effect of award types on auction outcomes
Policy Memo 4: The effect of competition levels on auction outcomes
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1. Overview – introducing pre-qualification criteria and 
penalties in auctions 
Pre-qualification criteria and penalties are two auction design elements that can have significant influence on 
the auction as a whole. In auctions for renewable energy support, the two measures can be used to ensure 
high effectiveness, i.e. a high project realisation rate, however, they may affect the resulting support levels as 
well. Pre-qualification and penalties may also be used to achieve secondary goals.   The following list 
presents the different objectives that can be addressed by pre-qualification and penalties: 
- High effectiveness: 
o Ensure seriousness of bid 
o Prevent strategic bidding 
o Prevent delay 
o Prevent non-compliance 
- Secondary goals: 
o Promote certain project characteristics 
o Development of industry 
o Secure local support 
o Secure good relations 
Section 2 of this report provides an introduction to the policy goals. Section 3 follows with a description of the 
variety of design measures regarding pre-qualification criteria and penalties, together with the possible impact 
on auction outcome and some examples from past implementations in auctions. Table 1 below provides the 
link between policy objectives and design measures to be considered. 
 
Table 1 – Possible objectives and list of measures (pre-qualification criteria and penalties), that can be used to reach 
them.  
Objective Measure 
Secure seriousness of bid 
 
Pre-qualification criteria related to: 
- Project development stage 
- Developer experience 
- Developer financial competence  
Penalties  
- Non-compliance and delay 
- Production related penalties 
Prevent strategic bidding Penalties for non-completion 
Prevent delay Pre-qualification criteria related to: 
- Project development stage 
- Developer experience 
Penalties for delay 
- Reduction of support period 
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- Reduction of support level 
- Fixed penalties 
Prevent non-compliance Pre-qualification criteria related to: 
- Project development stage 
- Developer experience 
- Developer financial competence 
Penalties for non-compliance 
- Fixed penalties 
- Exclusion from future auctions 
- Production related penalties 
Promote certain project 
characteristics 
Pre-qualification criteria related to: 
- Technical specifications 
- Geographical specifications 
- Environmental impact 
Development of industry 
 
Pre-qualification criteria related to: 
- Technical specifications 
- Job and cluster creation 
Secure local support 
 
Pre-qualification criteria related to: 
- Local involvement 
- Job and cluster creation 
Secure good relations 
 
Pre-qualification criteria related to: 
- Developer’s history of good conduct 
Penalty: 
- Exclusion from future auctions 
 
 
2. Description of policy goals 
In this section the policy goals which can be affected by pre-qualification criteria and penalties are briefly 
described. 
High effectiveness 
Ensure seriousness of bid 
Serious bids are those which make completion of the project possible and economically sensible. A serious 
bidder has a true intention of actually completing the project (or in case of tradable contracts, having someone 
to complete the projects). Therefore, the seriousness of bids is very important for the project realisation rate. 
For bidders to make a serious bid, they need a sound understanding of the project cost and execution. Pre-
  
 3 
 
qualification criteria can ensure that bidders collect sufficient information about the project. Furthermore, 
penalties can help to reduce the number of unserious bidders and bids. 
Prevent strategic bidding 
Policy makers would like the bids to reflect the expected cost of the project. This is because higher bids would 
lead to higher support cost, while lower bids potentially could result in non-realisation of the winning projects. 
Strategic bidding, where project developers place bids that do not correspond to expected costs, should be 
avoided. Penalties for non-completion are one way of reducing strategic underbidding. The penalties increase 
the incentives for avoiding the situation of non-completion and therefore push the bidders towards higher cost-
reflecting bids. 
Prevent delay 
Delays in the realisation of the winning projects could potentially result in policy targets not being reached on 
time. Furthermore, delays can cause problems for the energy supply planning, for instance if the new 
installation were expected to cover an increasing demand, delays may result in reduced security of supply 
until completed. 
One method for preventing delay is to increase the incentives for on-time completion by imposing delay 
penalties. It is important that the delay penalty creates motivation for finishing the project rather than pushing 
the developer towards non-completion. Another method to prevent delays is to require developers to have 
addressed possible causes for delay before qualifying for auction participation, for instance by having 
obtained relevant permits. Developer experience may also reduce the risk of delays.  
Prevent non-compliance 
Non-compliance including non-completion of projects can cause problems similar to those of delays and 
should therefore be minimised. A developer may be reluctant to complete a project if it proves unprofitable, 
either because of changing price or cost estimates or if the winning bid was given too low in the first place. 
Pre-qualification criteria related to the project development stage or the developer’s experience may reduce 
project cost uncertainties, which would result in bids with higher quality and more certain assumptions. 
Furthermore, too low bid prices can potentially be prevented by a non-completion penalty. Also, penalties 
change the economic consideration of developers: if small changes in costs or prices would render the project 
slightly unprofitable, leading to a lower loss than the penalty level, then there is still an economic rationale in 
developing the project in order to minimise loss. However, in case of developer bankruptcy penalties will not 
be effective, lowering the incentive effect. This issue can be addressed with additional pre-qualification criteria 
related to the developer’s financial competence. 
Secondary objectives 
Please notice that a detailed discussion of secondary objectives can be found in Policy memo 1 on Secondary 
objectives in auctions (Steinhilber 2016b). 
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Promote certain project characteristics 
Renewable energy deployment targets or other national policies may prescribe certain characteristics of the 
projects, for instance with regard to technology or geographical distribution. Pre-qualification criteria can 
include these aspects by only allowing projects with the specific characteristics to participate in the auction. 
Development of industry 
Alongside the goal of reaching RES deployment targets, the auctioned renewable energy support can be used 
to economically support the related industries. Secondary goals like sector or cluster development can be 
incorporated in pre-qualification criteria by for instance limiting the technology to that of the supported sector, 
or alternatively by including criteria related to job creation. 
Secure local support 
Public acceptance is crucial for the success of a renewable energy policy, and policy makers would therefore 
like to address local support aspects in the policy design. This could be realised using pre-qualification criteria 
such as financial participation of local communities. 
Secure good relations 
Besides promoting compliance with the conditions stated in the support contract, it is important to the 
contracting authority and the state offering renewable energy support, that the supported companies adhere 
to general legislation regarding financial management and social contributions, and to avoid that the public 
finances are used for bribery, fraud or similar. To mitigate the risk of such irregularities, pre-qualification 
requirements can emphasise good relations between state authorities and the bidder, for instance by referring 
to the bidder’s historical tax payments, or by penalising deviating conduct through exclusion from the auction.  
 
3. Assessment of measures 
Pre-qualification criteria 
Requirements on the RES projects or project developers which must be fulfilled in order to qualify for 
participation in the auction are known as pre-qualification criteria. The impact on the auction outcome 
depends on how the criteria are designed. If the criteria are imposed as restrictions, the potential auction 
participants are reduced to only certain classes of bidders. In this case, the criteria do not cause any auction 
specific costs for the participating bidders; however, fewer auction participants may reduce competition, 
potentially resulting in higher support levels. Another type of pre-qualification rules is those occurring at a cost 
for the bidder. These are usually project specific and are often referred to as the physical or material pre-
qualification. The cost occurring during this pre-qualification will be lost at least in case the bidder is not 
successful in the auction, thus winning becomes even more important to the bidder. Therefore, costly pre-
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qualification may lead to more aggressive bidding behaviour, i.e. lower bids. The tendency is particularly 
prevalent when auctions are not to be repeated or no clear auction schedule exists. The third type of pre-
qualification is financial pre-qualification, which requires bidders to present a financial guarantee. The financial 
pre-qualification is usually linked to penalties, as the guarantees can be retained in case the bidder does not 
live up to its contractual liabilities. 
The documentation requirements related to each policy aspect should be coordinated with other 
documentation requirements in order to reduce unnecessary workload of the bidder. If, for instance, a building 
permission is required, and an environmental impact assessment (EIA) was needed in order to obtain it, then 
there is no need for an additional requirement of presenting the EIA separately during the pre-qualification. 
In the tables below, possible aspects to be considered in the design of the pre-qualification criteria are 
presented. The design options are divided into those criteria related to the project itself and those related to 
the project developer. 
Project related pre-qualification criteria 
Technical specifications 
Description of the measure The technical requirements of the project define the technology focus of 
the auction scheme. Besides the generation technology, these pre-
qualification criteria usually include a capacity range and plant efficiency 
requirements, but they may also prescribe any other technical aspect that 
is to be promoted by the auction scheme, for instance grid connection 
type, certain ramping rates, specific materials to be used, and so on. In 
order to pre-qualify, project developers will need to document that the 
project fulfils the requirements. 
Effects on auction outcome The technology focus and allowed capacity are core elements of the 
auction design and they naturally restrict the actors that can participate in 
the auction. If a scheme including mature technologies is chosen, a lower 
support level is expected than if only new, innovative technologies qualify 
for participation. Restrictive technical requirements may furthermore 
impede competition and lead to a higher support level. 
Examples GERMANY: The auction scheme for PV plants in Germany requires the 
installation to be ground-mounted and have a capacity between 100 kW 
and 10 MW. For more information on the German scheme please see 
Tiedemann (2015). 
CROATIA: (suggested) Biomass fired Combined Heat and Power 
technology needs to have an overall efficiency greater than 50% in order 
to participate in the auction. For more information regarding the proposed 
Croatian scheme see Rosenlund Soysal and Kitzing (2016). 
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Geographical specification 
Description of the measure Geographical specifications as a pre-qualification criteria impose 
restrictions on the physical location of the winning project. The location 
can be restricted to land with certain characteristics or to specific regions, 
which the auctioneer has pre-defined as feasible. A geographical pre-
qualification criterion is only relevant for multiple-item auctions. In the case 
of single-item auctions, the site is pre-selected by the auctioneer.  
More information regarding geographical specifications can be found in 
Policy Memo 1 on Secondary Objectives in Auctions (Steinhilber 2016b). 
Effects on auction outcome Restrictions regarding location may lead to higher generation costs due to 
resource availability or land tenure prices, resulting in increased support 
levels. 
Examples GERMANY: The German auction scheme for ground-mounted solar PV 
only allows bids for projects on specified types of locations. The intention 
behind the restriction is to avoid using land with a high agricultural value 
for PV plants. For more information please see Tiedemann (2015). 
 
Job and clusters creation 
Description of the measure Pre-qualification criteria regarding job and cluster creation can be a good 
way of promoting industry development. 
When designing the job and cluster creation criteria, it should be kept in 
mind that the criteria cannot contain preferential treatment to local 
companies for instance by preventing companies belonging to industries 
abroad from participating in the auction. More information regarding local 
content can be found in Policy Memo 1 on Secondary Objectives in 
Auctions (Steinhilber 2016b). 
Effects on auction outcome An important consideration is how the job and cluster creation is included 
in the auction. For instance it may be sufficient to provide an assessment 
proving that these issues have been considered. Alternatively a minimum 
requirement can be imposed. It is also possible that the job and cluster 
aspects are included as a non-price criterion in the selection of the winning 
bid, and in this case documentation shall be provided during the pre-
qualification. 
If the requirements for qualifying are high, resulting in significant additional 
cost for the project developer, the auction is expected to give a higher 
support level than if no requirements were imposed.  
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Examples DENMARK: In the third auction for offshore wind at Horns Rev (HR3) in 
Denmark a social clause on apprenticeships was included in the pre-
qualification criteria. The clause ensured that a certain (individual) number 
of trainees are used in the construction of the wind farm. For more 
information about the Danish auctions, please see Kitzing and Wendring 
(2015). 
UK: In the UK auction scheme, bidding projects with installed capacity 
greater than 300 MW, needs to present a ‘supply chain plan’ in order to 
pre-qualify. The plan needs to contain details on how the project will 
promote competition, innovation and skills in the supply chain, and it must 
be submitted and approved. For more information on the auctions in UK, 
please see Fitch-Roy and Woodman (2016). 
 
Environmental impact 
Description of the measure Environmental aspects can be addressed in the pre-qualification criteria by 
requiring for instance environmental impact assessment, product life cycle 
assessments or certification. Furthermore, a minimum requirement related 
to impact can be imposed. Alternatively, the environmental impact can be 
included as a non-price criterion when choosing the winning project. In 
both cases relevant documentation needs to be defined by the policy 
maker and presented by project developers in order to pre-qualify for 
participating in the auction. 
The environmental impact of the installation may affect the ability to obtain 
construction permits. If no construction permit needs to be presented 
during pre-qualification, it would be appropriate to require documentation 
that the project lives up to the environmental requirements needed for 
obtaining the construction permit. In this way the risk of non-completion 
due to lack of construction permit can be mitigated. 
Effects on auction outcome Strict environmental requirements may increase project cost, reduce the 
number of participating bidders, and potentially increase support levels. 
However, the cost of obtaining required assessments will appear as sunk 
cost in case the bidder does not win the auction, thus high costs of fulfilling 
the requirements may lead bidders to bid more aggressively in order to 
increase chances of winning. 
Examples FRANCE: In order to participate in the roof-mounted PV auction in France 
a life cycle CO2 assessment for the installation had to be presented. The 
result of the assessment was then used as a non-price criterion in the 
selection of the auction winner. The CO2 assessment was allegedly 
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difficult to obtain and as a result many potential bidders chose not to 
participate in the auction. Furthermore, many bidders were disqualified 
because of errors in the assessment. In addition, bidders needed to 
present ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 certification (or equivalent) for the PV 
module and inverter manufacturers. The two standards deal with quality 
control and environmental management, respectively. For more 
information on the French PV auction scheme see Förster (2016). 
 
Local involvement 
Description of the measure In order to increase local acceptance and support from communities 
wishing to engage in the development towards a greener energy sector, 
local involvement can be promoted through pre-qualification criteria. One 
way of including such criteria in the pre-qualification is to apply reduced 
requirements for certain bidders, for instance cooperatives. Alternatively, 
requirements on minimum amount of local ownership can be imposed. 
Strict requirements particularly regarding the financial capabilities or 
experience of the companies wishing to engage in the auction, can lead to 
exclusion of certain bidders, including local initiatives. To avoid this, 
reduced requirements can be considered for this group of bidders. 
More information regarding actor diversity can be found in Policy Memo 1 
on Secondary Objectives in Auctions (Steinhilber 2016b). 
Effects on auction outcome Local opposition to new installations can result in delays or in the worst 
case to non-completion of projects. On the other hand, local involvement 
may secure a smooth project execution process and thereby increase the 
project realisation rate, even if pre-qualification criteria are more lenient 
than for other bidders. It can furthermore be argued that unlike private 
corporations, local communities do not engage in green energy for the 
profit, and they are therefore likely to expect a lower return on investment. 
This could result in lower support levels when citizens are involved, 
however, also in an inefficient outcome, as it may not be the projects with 
lowest cost that win the auction. 
Examples GERMANY: In Germany, reduced pre-qualification criteria in the onshore 
wind auctions are discussed for citizen cooperatives. 
 
Project development stage 
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Description of the measure Pre-qualification regarding the project development stage are intended to 
secure that all bidders are serious and have a sound understanding of 
their project. Moreover the requirements can help prevent occurrences of 
unforeseen obstacles, which results in delays or non-realisation of the 
project. 
The required documentation is typically a detailed project description, grid 
access, land tenure, environmental permits and construction permits. For 
simple installations fewer requirements are also possible. 
Effects on auction outcome The project development stage is very important for the auction outcome. 
While high requirements generally improve realisation rates, they may lead 
to higher support costs because of lower uncertainties regarding project 
development cost. Low uncertainty prevents auction participants from 
bidding according to over-optimistic cost estimates.  
High pre-development requirements create sunk costs for the bidders, as 
they will not be able to recover the expenses for permits etc. if they are not 
awarded in the auction. If competition is strong, bidders will not price these 
sunk costs into their bids. In the long run, this will be problematic, 
especially for small bidders with small project portfolios. This problem will 
be particularly pronounced if there will be no new auction round before 
obtained permits expire.  
Examples IRELAND: The Irish AER III scheme suffered from high non-realisation 
rates. While part of the winning bidders had difficulty obtaining planning 
permission and were thus not realised, there were at the same time 
significant potential wind park capacities holding planning permission but 
not an AER contract. In order to address this problem the following auction 
round required all bidding projects to have secured planning permission. 
Later auction rounds also required bidders to hand in an indicative cash 
flow statement showing that the proposed project could at least break 
even. For more information on the Irish scheme see Steinhilber (2016a).  
NETHERLANDS: In the Dutch auction SDE+ scheme project developers 
are required to present a written permission of the owner of the 
location/land, a (technical) description of the installation, and a feasibility 
study in order to qualify for participating in the auction. Furthermore, an 
environmental permit, and for geothermal projects also an exploration 
permit and completed geological survey, is needed. For more information 
on the Dutch scheme please see Noothout and Winkel (2016). 
ITALY: In the Italian auction scheme bidders need to have a building 
permission or concession as well as a connection offer from the grid 
operator formally accepted by the plant owner. For more information 
please see Tiedemann, Förster, and Wigand (2016). 
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Project developer related pre-qualification criteria 
Developer’s experience 
Description of the measure Requiring documented experience with similar projects may be a way to 
reduce risk of delay and non-completion. It is a typical pre-qualification 
requirement, in particular in auctions for large and complex projects. 
Developer experience can be expressed in terms of current installed or 
developed capacity, or educational level and tenure of the personnel. 
Effects on auction outcome Strict requirements related to the past experience of the developer 
specifically keep small actors and new market entrants from participating 
in the auction. This may reduce competition significantly and influence the 
bid level, in particular in countries with only few and large actors. If 
applying such criteria, a strategy for reaching international players could 
potentially be considered in order to keep competition at a reasonable 
level. 
Examples DENMARK: In the Danish offshore auction for Horns Rev 3, bidders 
needed to present one reference of operation and maintenance of an 
offshore wind farm with an installed capacity of minimum 25 MW. 
Furthermore, reference of development and management of construction 
of offshore wind farms for at least one wind farm with a minimum size of 
100MW was a requirement for qualifying for auction participation. As a 
result mainly large, experienced energy companies were taking part in the 
auction. For more information regarding the Danish offshore scheme 
please see Kitzing and Wendring (2015). 
PORTUGAL: In Portugal proof of technical capability was required for 
participating in the auction for RES support. Technical capability was 
presumed if the bidder had at least 30MW of installed capacity under 
exploitation, when the bid submission was made. For more information 
please see del Río (2016a). 
 
Developer’s financial competence 
Description of the measure A requirement regarding the financial robustness of the bidding company 
can be used to mitigate the risk of the winning bidder failing to find the 
necessary funding or even filing for bankruptcy before the project is 
realised. The criterion can be designed as a restriction, for instance by 
allowing only companies with a minimum credit rating or annual turnover to 
participate in the auction. Additionally, bid-bonds used as a financial 
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guarantee to be provided when entering the auction are typically required. 
Bid bonds are often connected to the penalty level, and can be retained by 
the auctioneer in case of project delay or non-completion. Instead of 
requiring a bid bond of the full amount in the beginning, a two-step 
approach can be taken: A first bid bond can be paid upon entering the 
auction. In case the bidder wins the auction but then withdraws from 
signing a support agreement with the contracting party, the first bid bond is 
retained. A second bid bond can be paid by winning bidders upon signing 
the construction and support agreement with the contracting authority, and 
can be enforced in case the bidder fails to complete the project within a 
certain pre-specified time frame. 
Finally, a proof of funding in terms of loan commitments can also be used 
as a pre-qualifying criterion ensuring efficient means of the bidder to 
complete the project. 
Financial pre-qualifications are often combined with material pre-
qualifications related to the project development stage. When the 
auctioneer sets high material pre-qualification requirements, financial 
qualification requirements can be set lower, and vice versa.  
Effects on auction outcome Strict requirements regarding rating and turnover can reduce the number 
of especially small project developers in the auction. In this way 
competition may be reduced resulting in higher support levels. If significant 
amounts of capital need to be deposited upon signing of the support 
contract the support level is likewise expected to increase, as the support 
also has to cover the opportunity cost of the deposited capital, alternatively 
the cost of bank guarantees. It may be beneficial to consider the timing of 
the deposition of the financial guarantees – if the bidder has some time for 
negotiating with the banks, the cost of financing are likely to be reduced. 
Furthermore, bid bonds which can be retained in case of non-compliance 
increase the risk of the bidders, potentially leading to higher bid-prices. 
Penalties are, however, expected to increase project realisation rates. 
Examples Examples for bid bond sizes applied in different auction schemes: 
Country Technology focus First bid bond Second bid bond 
Portugal Wind and biomass €10  per kW €25 per kW 
Germany Solar PV €4 per kW €50 per kW 
Spain Onshore wind and biomass - €20 per kW 
Italy Multi 5% of estimated investment costs 
10% of estimated 
investment cost 
Croatia Multi HRK 50 per kW (approx. €6.5) 
HRK 300 per kW 
(approx. €40) 
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DENMARK: In the offshore wind power auction Horns Rev 3 in Denmark a 
letter of intent was required from a financial institution of a demand 
guarantee of DKK 100 million. Moreover, the project developer needed to 
have a minimum annual average turnover of DKK 15 billion (€2 billion) 
over the last 3 years. Finally the bidders were required to have an equity 
ratio of 20% or above, alternatively have a long term debt rating of BBB or 
above (Standard and Poor’s and Fitch) or Baa3 or above (Moody’s). For 
more information on the Danish auction scheme please see Kitzing and 
Wendring (2015). 
 
Developer’s history of good conduct 
Description of the measure Pre-qualification related to good conduct of the developer may include 
many different aspects. For instance, the auctioneer may require that the 
bidder has no (or limited) tax debt or that the project managers have a 
clean criminal record. 
Another way of promoting good conduct is to require certain management 
certification. 
Effects on auction outcome Requirements regarding the history of good conduct may work as a 
restriction for auction participation, reduce the number of participants and, 
potentially lead to increased support costs. If, however, the requirements 
can be fulfilled at a cost for the bidder, it would add to the pre-qualification 
costs, hence increase the sunk cost in case the bidder loses the auction. 
To increase chances of winning the bidders may bid more aggressively.   
Examples DENMARK: In the Danish offshore auction scheme potential bidders were 
disqualified if their public debt was more than DKK 100,000. For more 
information on the auction scheme in Denmark, please see Kitzing and 
Wendring (2015). 
CROATIA (proposed): In order to participate in the proposed Croatian 
scheme a bidder must document that they have paid all required taxes, 
health insurances and pensions for employees, as well as produce a 
certified statement, ensuring that the person responsible for the bid has 
not been convicted of bribery, fraud or similar crimes. For more information 
please see Rosenlund Soysal and Kitzing (2016). 
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Penalties 
Penalties can be imposed on the project developer in case the project is delayed or fails to comply with the 
requirements stated in the support contract, including non-realisation of projects. The penalties are often 
linked to financial pre-qualification, where financial guarantees are presented upon entering the auction.  
The distinction between delay and non-realisation should be defined in the auction material. While non-
realisation of a project generally leads to the cancellation of contracts and payment of fixed penalty (often by 
retaining of the bid bonds), there are more penalty design options for delay penalties, for instance reduced 
support level or period. The fairness of the penalty can be considered in the design - for instance, a policy 
maker may want to apply special rules in case the delay is neither caused nor influenced by the project 
holder. Finally, it is important to design delay penalties in a way that they promote completion of the project 
and do not introduce greater risk of non-realisation of the projects. 
 
Fixed penalties (one-off payments) 
Description of the measure Fixed penalties can be enforced in case of delays or non-completion of the 
contracted project. In order to secure the payment of the penalty, a 
security usually has to be provided by the bidder, either in terms of bank 
guarantees or cash in a designated bank account. If security is provided it 
is usually referred to as financial pre-qualification. In case of multi-item 
auctions, it is common to set the fixed penalties as an amount per kW 
capacity offered in the bid, while the fixed penalties in single item auction 
can be set regardless of project capacity. 
Effects on auction outcome Fixed penalties can improve realisation rates, however, they increase the 
risk of the bidders. Non-compliance penalties without guarantees affect 
small and large players differently – on the one hand, it can be argued that 
in case the penalty exceeds the company’s assets, the company may 
declare bankruptcy and in this way fully or partly avoid paying the 
penalties. In this way the penalty size affect small companies (e.g. single-
project companies created by larger companies as a part of their risk 
strategy) less than large companies, who do not have this default option. 
As a result small companies may bid more aggressively than large ones, 
potentially leading to an inefficient auction outcome. On the other hand, 
the credit risk of small bidders increases with the penalty level, leading to 
increased cost of financing the project, higher project cost and therefore 
potentially higher bids. 
In case financial guarantees (bid-bonds) have to be provided, the 
additional cost of guarantees may result in higher project cost and 
therefore higher support levels. 
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Too large penalties may reduce interest in participating in the auction and 
thereby reduce competition. Furthermore, if a delay penalty is to be paid 
before the completion of the project, it may be a burden in the liquidity 
budget and increase the risk of non-realisation and default. Furthermore, 
too low a penalty level may lead to a more aggressive bidding behaviour 
and in the worst case to underbidding, leading to non-completion of 
projects. 
Examples SPAIN: In the Spanish auctions, in case of non-compliance by the agreed 
date (48 months after being awarded), the contracting authority would 
enforce the bank guarantees of 20€/kW. For more information on the 
Spanish auction scheme please see Río (2016b). 
DENMARK: In the Danish offshore wind auction of Anholt a fixed penalty 
was charged in case of delayed grid connection of the last turbine. The 
penalty was between DKK 100 and 400 million (€ 13.4 and 53.7 million) 
depending on the timing of the delay announcement. Combined with a 
reduction in support level in case of delayed grid connection of the first 
turbine, the penalty has been considered the main reason for poor auction 
participation (auctioneers received only one bid). For more information on 
the Danish offshore auctions please see Kitzing and Wendring (2015). 
For examples of bid bond levels please see the section on Pre-
qualification criteria, Developer’s financial competence, page 10. 
 
Reduction of support level 
Description of the measure When a project is delayed, an alternative to fixed penalties can be a 
reduction of support level. In this way the penalty payment is postponed 
until the installation starts generating revenue, and it is furthermore spread 
out throughout a longer period of time. 
Effects on auction outcome With a reduction of support level the negative impact of a fixed penalty on 
the company’s liquidity can be avoided. The postponement of the penalty 
payment is therefore less likely to result in default and non-completion of 
projects; however, like fixed penalties, the reduction of support level is 
likely to increase bid levels. 
Setting the support level reduction appropriately can be challenging. On 
the one hand, a too high support reduction in case of delay can render the 
project unprofitable, and the bidder may choose non-completion instead of 
realising the project with delay. On the other hand, a too low reduction will 
have no effect. 
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Examples ITALY: In the Italian multi-technology auction schemes the awarded FIT or 
alternatively FIP are reduced by 0.5% for each month of delay. After a 
tolerance of 12-24 months, the FIT and FIP contracts are withdrawn. For 
more information on the Italian auction schemes please see Tiedemann et 
al. (2016). 
GERMANY: If projects winning the German auction scheme for ground-
mounted solar PV are not commissioned within a period of 18 month, the 
FIT decreases by €0.3 cent / kWh. More information regarding the German 
auction scheme can be found in Tiedemann (2015). 
 
Reduction of support period 
Description of the measure An alternative to fixed penalties or reduction in support level is the 
reduction in support period. Like fixed penalties and reduction of support 
level, support period reduction creates incentive for completing the project 
on time, however, the penalty payment is postponed even further than in 
the case of support reduction. The support period reduction can be defined 
for instance relative to the delay period, or by setting a fixed date for 
discontinuation of support payments, implying that late completion will lead 
to an overall shorter support period. 
Effects on auction outcome Due to the postponement of the financial implications of the delay penalty, 
reduction of support period has less negative effect on the liquidity of the 
project developer in case of delay. This penalty type is therefore less likely 
to cause default before completion of project. The penalty creates 
incentives for completing the project because the project developer would 
still like to avoid delay penalty, but is less likely to reduce the number of 
bidders compared to fixed penalties enforced when delays occur. 
Examples FRANCE: In the French auction scheme for solar PV, support duration is 
reduced by the delay, multiplied by 2. The installation has to be connected 
18 months after publication of the auction results. For more information 
please see Förster (2016). 
IRELAND: In Ireland, the 15-year PPAs offered under AER V and AER VI 
schemes will not extend beyond the end of 2018 and 2019, respectively. 
Projects which came online too late will therefore not be able to make use 
of the full duration of the contract. Similarly, the 10-year PPAs given to 
biomass CHP projects cannot exceed the end of 2016. For more 
information please see Steinhilber (2016a). 
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Exclusion from future auctions 
Description of the measure In case of non-compliance or misconduct, bidders can be excluded from 
future auctions for a certain period of time. The exclusion can either be of 
the bidding projects or the developers themselves. If exclusion is used as 
a penalty, it is important that exclusion together with pre-qualification 
requirements are defined in a way that does not offer a possibility to 
circumvent exclusion by for instance redefining project or transferring 
project ownership.  
Effects on auction outcome Exclusion provides incentive for avoiding non-compliance; hence it 
promotes increased seriousness of bids. In case pre-qualification costs are 
very high, exclusion can be very costly to the project developer, as it can 
prevent them from reusing the same project in following auction rounds. 
However, compared to the case of fixed penalties, exclusions are less 
likely to reduce the number of potential bidders, as it can be more difficult 
to quantify the value of exclusion. It is therefore less likely to increase 
support level compared to fixed penalties. 
Examples UK: In the auction scheme in the UK, the primary penalty is the exclusion 
of any project on the same physical location from future auctions for a 
period of thirteen months. The project developers can be penalised either 
if being offered a support contract and refusing to sign it or if signing a 
support contract and failing to deliver the project. For more information 
regarding the British auction scheme please see Fitch-Roy and Woodman 
(2016). 
NETHERLANDS: In the Dutch auction scheme, the SDE+, project loses its 
support right and is excluded from participating again for a period of 3 
years, if the project is not operational within the realisation period (3-4 
years). However, in some cases it is possible to work around this 
exemption by “redefining” the project (e.g. by changing the capacity or the 
location) and apply again. For more information on the SDE+ please see 
Noothout and Winkel (2016). 
 
Production related penalties 
Description of the measure Production related penalties can be imposed in cases where the 
production of contracted and finalised installations deviates from what was 
indicated by the project bid, e.g. in terms of quantity. Situations where 
contracted installations produce less than expected, the security of supply 
in the power system can potentially be challenged. On the other hand, if 
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remuneration is awarded by generated kWh, too much production may 
lead to support budgets being exceeded. 
The penalty level can be either fixed or for instance based on the deviation 
from expected/contracted production or support costs, and may include 
exclusion from future auctions. The duration over which the production 
deviation is calculated is an important parameter to consider when 
designing the penalty. 
Another variation of production related penalties are those enforced when 
deviations from the contracted production method occur. This is relevant 
for instance in biomass based power generation, where penalties can be 
imposed if the consumed fuel does not live up to the fuel mix specified in 
the pre-qualification criteria. 
Effects on auction outcome Penalties for lower than expected power generation increases the risk of 
the investor and is therefore likely to increase support levels. This is 
particularly valid in auctions for Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) 
installations such as wind farms and solar PV, where the generation is 
greatly dependent on local conditions and may vary from year to year. 
Likewise, penalties for excess production increase the risk of the bidder 
and may also increase support level. 
Production related penalties give incentive for bidders of VRE projects to 
obtain a proper understanding of the location, for instance wind speeds 
and duration which are needed to determine the output of wind power 
plants. While this may reduce the number of interested bidders, the quality 
of the bids is increased.  
Examples POLAND: The Polish onshore wind power scheme includes a penalty for 
production deficit, i.e. failing to deliver the full contracted electricity volume. 
Delivering less than 85% of the offered volume in a settlement period of 3 
years will result in a financial penalty at the rate of 50% of the awarded 
price times the total undelivered electricity. For more information please 
see Kitzing and Wendring (2016). 
CROATIA (proposed): Fines of HRK 1,000.00-50,000.00 can be imposed 
in case the contracted producer fails to maintain the technological 
requirements needed for obtaining the status as eligible producer, fails to 
submit the required documentation, fails to maintain metering equipment, 
or conducts changes in installations without prior consent. For more 
information on the proposed Croatian auction scheme please see 
Rosenlund Soysal and Kitzing (2016). 
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4. Conclusions 
Pre-qualification criteria and penalties are important design parameters and can be used to obtain a wide 
range of policy objectives. While pre-qualification criteria that restrict participation can result in reduced 
competition leading to increased support levels, those criteria met at a cost would generally result in more 
aggressive bidding. Penalties increase the risk of the bidders and can potentially increase the bid prices. Pre-
qualification and penalties promote high realisation rates, however, as the design of the parameters can have 
significant impact on the auction outcome and support level, careful evaluation of the potential design 
measures are advisable. 
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